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Abstract
The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the
players' asymmetric information. We show that this property is not just a technical
artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we
devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic,
objective issues of possible uncertainty, which is equivalent to the existence of a common
prior.
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1 Introduction
The common prior assumption (Harsanyi 1967-68) is pervasive in most economic models
of asymmetric information. It asserts that the beliefs of individuals in diﬀerent states
of the world are the posteriors they form given their private information from a prior
which is common to them all. Morris (1995) elaborates upon the possible normative
justiÞcations for this assumption.
However, when states of the world are constructed from explicit descriptions of the
individuals hierarchies of mutual beliefs (Mertens and Zamir 1985), it turns out that
belief subspaces with a common prior are the exception rather than the rule. In particular,
a common prior does not emerge from any natural assumption in this explicit construction
of economic types. The positive value of the common priors assumption is therefore at
stake: By examining the beliefs of individuals at a given situation (or state of the
world), can one tell whether they originate from a common prior? If the answer is
negative, it means that having a common prior can only be meaningful for the modeler,
∗The Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, The California Institute of Technology and The
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who observes it as a mere technical regularity across the states in the model, with no
economic content. If, on the other hand, the answer is positive, the assumption is testable,
and in any speciÞc economic interaction we can check for its validity by eliciting the beliefs
of individuals in the situation at hand.
Up till now, the literature oﬀers characterizations of the common prior assumption
in terms of the expectations the individuals ascribe to random variables (Morris 1994,
Samet 1998a,b, Halpern 19981). In the way they are presented, it is not clear whether
these characterizations are positive in the above sense: To describe a random variable,
the individuals have to know the structure the of the state space, which is an abstract
construct of the modeler, and not necessarily the form in which the individuals grasp
the uncertain environment in which they act. Alternatively, Feinberg (2000) oﬀers a
characterization in terms of the individuals beliefs regarding events in an augmented
state space, which incorporates the outcomes of a commonly known randomizing device.
Here again, an exogenous construct (the randomizing device) has to be alluded to.
The main contribution we propose here is in showing that when the state space is
compact, we have a positive characterization for the existence of a common prior, which
requires only to elicit the individuals mutual beliefs on the fundamentals of the interaction
(the basic or nature events), like payoﬀs entailed by the possible actions. In such an
enquiry, the questions posed to the individuals can be phrased using expressions in natural
language, without referring to any model or abstract structure.
Here is the essence of the argument for the case of two individuals. There is no
common prior among the individuals if and only if there is a zero-sum bet that they are
both willing to take (as expected value maximizers), and such that this fact is common
belief between them (Feinberg 2000). The bet is a continuous random variable. Since the
space is compact, it is also common belief between them that their assessed expected gains
from the bet are bounded away from zero. This turns to imply that we can uniformly
approximate this bet by a simple zero-sum bet, whose Þnitely many possible outcomes
depend on events described by expressions with Þnitely many words each2, and such that
the subjectively assessed gains of the new bet are still commonly believed to be positive
and bounded away from zero. And though the exact individual assessments of the bet
are not commonly known, it turns out that there is a Þnite set of suﬃcient justiÞcations
to like the bet, such that it is commonly believed that at least one of these justiÞcations
obtains for each individual. These justiÞcations are phrased in terms of bounds on the
probabilities of the expressions which determine the outcome of the bet. Therefore, this
set of justiÞcations can also be described with Þnitely many words, and common belief
that one of them obtains is equivalent to the lack of a common prior.
Section 2 presents the technical preliminaries and deÞnitions. Section 3 contains the
statement and proof of the main result. The appendix brings a very short proof to a
1Halpern 1998 uses a logical syntax which express the individuals expectations of random variables
with Þnitely many values.
2Expressions will be formally deÞned in the following section.
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characterization of common priors in compact spaces due to Feinberg (2000), generalizing
a technique of Samet (1998).
2 Preliminaries
A (topological) type space is a Hausdorﬀ space Ω, such that every individual i in the
set {1, . . . , I} of individuals has a regular Borel probability measure ti(ω) on Ω in every
state ω ∈ Ω. This type mapping ti from Ω to the space ∆(Ω) of regular Borel probability
measures is assumed to be continuous, when ∆(Ω) is endowed with the topology of weak
convergence3.
The Borel subsets Σ of Ω are called events. A countable subÞeld Σ0 ⊆ Σ constitutes
the set of basic or natural events. These are events that describe objective circumstances,
like NASDAQ went up X% today or this combination of actions by the individuals
will result by those payoﬀs for them, but not any assertion that involves the beliefs or
knowledge of the individuals.
For every event E and a rational number p ∈ [0, 1],
Bpi (E) = {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) ≥ p}
is the event individual i assigns probability at least p to the event E4;
¬E = Ω \ E,
the complement of E, is the event not E. For two events E and F,
E ∩ F
is the event E and F.
The Þeld E of expressions is the one generated from the basic events Σ0 by using
consecutively ¬, ∩ and Bpi . Notice that the collection of expressions is countable, and
3This topology is generated by the sub-basis of sets of the form
{µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : µ(O) > r}
where O ⊆ Ω is open and r ∈ R (see e.g Billingsley 1968, appendix III). When Ω is Normal (and
in particular compact and/or metric), this topology coincides with the weak-∗ topology  the weakest
topology for which the mapping
f →
Z
Ω
fdµ
is continuous for every contiunuous real-valued function f on Ω.
4The continuity of ti guarantees that B
p
i (E) is indeed an event in Σ.
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thus can be enumerated in a sequence. We say that the expression E holds in a state
ω ∈ Ω when ω ∈ E. The set of expressions D(ω) that hold in the state ω is called the
description of ω. Denote by
D = {D(ω) : ω ∈ Ω}
the set of descriptions of the states in Ω.
We say that an expression E is common belief at ω if B1i1
¡
B1i2
¡
. . . B1ikE
¢¢
holds in ω
for every sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , I} .
We will assume that the set O of open expressions is a basis for the topology of Ω,
and therefore that the Þeld E of expressions generates the Borel σ-Þeld Σ of events. In
particular, diﬀerent descriptions hold in diﬀerent states.5
Expressions and descriptions are objects for a positive enquiry. At a given situation,
one can check whether certain expressions hold without having to refer explicitly to other
situations, as captured formally by other states of the model. This is important, because
the states of the model are abstract constructs deÞned by the modeler, but this is not
necessarily the way the modeled individuals capture the situation. Thus, to answer a
question whether she would take a certain gamble whose outcome depends on the states
of Ω, the individual has to understand what Ω is. In contrast, every expression can be
phrased with Þnitely many words and without any reference to Ω.
A probability measure Pi ∈ ∆(Ω) is a prior for individual i ∈ {1, . . . , I} if for every
event E ∈ Σ
Pi(E) =
Z
Ω
ti(ω)(E)dPi(ω).
The probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω) is a common prior if it is a prior for each of the
individuals i ∈ {1, . . . , I} .
In the analysis below, we will assume that Ω is not the union of proper belief-
subspaces, i.e. that it is not the case that for some event E ( Ω we have both
ti(ω)(E) = 1 ∀ω ∈ E, i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
ti(ω)(¬E) = 1 ∀ω ∈ ¬E, i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
(because if that were the case, we could elaborate upon the existence of a common prior
separately in E and ¬E).
5This means that Ω is non-redundant, in the sense that diﬀerent states indeed represent diﬀerent
situations. For example, if Ω has two states, it is not the case that every basic event E0 coincides either
with Ω or with the empty set, because otherwise the same description would obtain in both states of Ω :
Even if the individuals had diﬀerent beliefs across the two states their mutual beliefs on the basic events
would always coincide. In other words, in such a redundant space the diﬀerent types of an individual
across the two states do not diﬀer in any substantial way.
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3 A Positive Characterization of Common Priors
The main result of this work is the characterization of common priors in terms of ex-
pressions and descriptions when the type space is compact. We Þrst phrase and prove it
for the case of two individuals, and generalize the result to an arbitrary Þnite number of
players.
For the positive characterization we rely on the following proposition due to Fein-
berg (2000). The appendix brings a very short proof of the proposition, generalizing a
technique of Samet (1998).
Proposition 1 Let Ω be a compact type space with two individuals i ∈ {1, 2}. Then there
is no common prior among them if and only if there is a continuous random variable
f : Ω→ R for which Z
Ω
f(ω0)dt1(ω) < 0 <
Z
Ω
f(ω0)dt2(ω) (3.1)
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Building on this proposition, we can now provide the positive characterization:
Proposition 2 Let Ω be a compact type space with two individuals i ∈ {1, 2}. Then
there is no common prior in Ω if and only if there are expressions E1, . . . , En and rational
numbers {prk, qrk : k = 1, . . . n, r = 1, . . . , s} such that whatever is the state of the world
ω ∈ Ω which describes the situation at hand, the expression
s[
r=1
n\
k=1
³
¬Bprk1 Ek ∩Bq
r
k
2 Ek
´
(3.2)
is common belief at ω, while
nX
k=1
prk <
nX
k=1
qrk (3.3)
for r = 1, . . . , s
Proof. If there is a common prior, there can be no common belief among the individuals
that they disagree on the expectation of the random variable
Pn
k=1 χEk (where χF is the
5
indicator function of the event F )  see e.g. Cave (1983) or Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1990). But a common belief of such a disagreement follows from (3.2) and (3.3).
In the reverse direction, suppose there is no common prior. By proposition 1, (3.1)
holds for some continuous f. Since t1 and t2 are continuous maps, the functions Gi : Ω→
R deÞned by
Gi(ω) =
Z
Ω
f(ω0)dti(ω) i = 1, 2 (3.4)
are continuous. As Ω is compact, the functions Gi achieve their minimum and maximum
on Ω, so for some rational ε > 0 we have
G1(ω) < −2ε < 2ε < G2(ω) (3.5)
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Since f is continuous, for every rational x we have that f−1(x − ε, x + ε) is open,
and therefore a union of open expressions {Ox,αx} ⊆ O. Hence ∪x∈R {Ox,αx} is an open
cover of Ω, and by the compactness of Ω it has a Þnite sub-cover with open expressions
O1, . . . , Om, where for ` = 1, . . . ,m
O` ⊆ f−1(x` − ε, x` + ε) (3.6)
for some rational numbers x1, . . . , xm.
DeÞne F1 = O1, and then inductively F` = O` \ F`−1 for k = 2, . . . ,m. Then Ω is the
disjoint union of the expressions F1, . . . , Fm. DeÞne
g(ω) =
mX
`=1
x`χF`(ω) (3.7)
Then |f(ω0)− g(ω0)| < ε for every ω0 ∈ Ω, and we conclude thatZ
Ω
g(ω0)dt1(ω) < −ε < ε <
Z
Ω
g(ω0)dt2(ω) (3.8)
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Let d the least common denominator of the rational numbers x1, . . . , xm. For some
big enough positive integer c, the function
h(ω) = dg(ω) + c (3.9)
assumes Þnitely many positive integer values, and has the form
h(ω) =
nX
k=1
χEk(ω) (3.10)
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where E1, . . . , En is the list of expressions in which for ` = 1, . . . ,m, and ω ∈ F`, the
expression F` appears h(ω) times in the list.
It follows that for δ = dε > 0Z
Ω
h(ω0)dt1(ω) < c− δ < c + δ <
Z
Ω
h(ω0)dt2(ω) (3.11)
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Let L =
§
n
δ
¨
and uj = j
δ
n
for j = 0, . . . , L. Let
pωk =
½
min
0≤j≤L
uj : t1(ω)(Ek) < uj
¾
(3.12)
and
qωk =
½
max
0≤j≤L
uj : t2(ω)(Ek) ≥ uj
¾
. (3.13)
Then for every ω ∈ Ω, the expression
n\
k=1
³
¬Bpωk1 Ek ∩Bq
ω
k
2 Ek
´
(3.14)
holds at ω, and by (3.11)
nX
k=1
pωk < c <
nX
k=1
qωk . (3.15)
But the set {(pωk , qωk )nk=1 : ω ∈ Ω} is Þnite (the number of its elements does not exceed
(L + 1)2), and therefore it can be written as {(prk, qrk)nk=1 : r = 1, . . . s} for some Þnite
number s. It follows that the expression
s[
r=1
n\
k=1
³
¬Bprk1 Ek ∩Bq
r
k
2 Ek
´
(3.16)
holds in all the states of Ω, while
nX
k=1
prk <
nX
k=1
qrk (3.17)
for r = 1, . . . , s. Since Ω is common belief in any of its states, the conclusion of the
proposition follows. ¥
We now turn to generalize this result for more than two individuals. Here again we
rely on the following proposition by Feinberg (2000).
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Proposition 3 Let Ω be a compact type space with individuals {1, . . . , I}. Then there
is no common prior among them if and only if there are continuous random variables
fi : Ω→ R, i = 1, . . . , I for which
IX
i=1
fi = 0 (3.18)
and Z
Ω
fi(ω
0)dti(ω) > 0 (3.19)
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 4 Let Ω be a compact type space with individuals i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Then there
is no common prior among them if and only if there are expressions
©
Ei1, . . . , E
i
ni
ªI
i=2
, a
positive integer c and rational numbers
©
prk,i, q
r
k,i : i = 2, . . . , I, k = 1, . . . ni, r = 1, . . . , s
ª
such that whatever is the state of the world ω ∈ Ω which describes the situation at hand,
the expression
s[
r=1
I\
i=2
ni\
k=1
³
¬Bp
r
k,i
1 E
i
k ∩B
qrk,i
i E
i
k
´
(3.20)
is common belief at ω, while
niX
k=1
qrk,i > c, i = 2, . . . , I (3.21)
and
IX
i=2
niX
k=1
prk,i < (I − 1)c (3.22)
for r = 1, . . . , s
Proof. Suppose that (3.20) is common belief while (3.21) and (3.22) obtain. Then there
can be no common prior. Indeed, if there had been a common prior P, then for
fi =
niX
k=1
χEik − c, i = 2, . . . I (3.23)
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and
f1 = −
IX
i=2
fi = (I − 1)c−
IX
i=2
niX
k=1
χEik . (3.24)
we would have by (3.21) and (3.22) that6 for every ω ∈ ΩZ
Ω
fidti(ω) > 0, i = 1, . . . I (3.25)
and therefore Z
Ω
fidP > 0, i = 1, . . . I (3.26)
which is impossible since
PI
i=1 fi = 0.
In the reverse direction, suppose there is no common prior. By proposition 3 there
are continuous random variables fi : Ω → R, i = 1, . . . , I for which (3.18) and (3.19)
obtain. Since ti are continuous maps, the functions Gi : Ω→ R deÞned by
Gi(ω) =
Z
Ω
fi(ω
0)dti(ω) i = 1, . . . I (3.27)
are continuous. As Ω is compact, the functions Gi achieve their minimum and maximum
on Ω, so for some rational ε > 0 we have
Gi(ω) > Iε i = 2, . . . I (3.28)
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Since the functions fi are continuous, for every rational x we have that f
−1
i (x−ε, x+ε)
is open, and therefore a union of open expressions
n
Oix,αix
o
⊆ O. Hence ∪x∈R
n
Oix,αix
o
is an open cover of Ω, and by the compactness of Ω it has a Þnite sub-cover with open
expressions Oi1, . . . , O
i
mi
, where for ` = 1, . . . ,mi
Oi` ⊆ f−1i (xi` − ε, xi` + ε) (3.29)
for some rational numbers xi1, . . . , x
i
mi
.
DeÞne F i1 = O
i
1, and then inductively F
i
` = O
i
`\F i`−1 for k = 2, . . . ,mi. Then for every
i = 1, . . . , I, the space Ω is the disjoint union of the expressions F i1, . . . , F
i
mi
. DeÞne
gi(ω) =
miX
`=1
xi`χF i` (ω) (3.30)
6Recall that we assume Ω does not contain proper common-belief sub-components.
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Then
|gi(ω0)− fi(ω0)| < ε (3.31)
and ¯¯¯¯
¯−
IX
i=2
gi(ω
0)− f1(ω0)
¯¯¯¯
¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯−
IX
i=2
gi(ω
0) +
IX
i=2
fi(ω
0)
¯¯¯¯
¯ < (I − 1) ε (3.32)
for every ω0 ∈ Ω, so we conclude from (3.28) and (3.31) thatZ
Ω
gi(ω
0)dti(ω) > (I − 1) ε ≥ ε, i = 2, . . . I (3.33)
and from (3.28) and (3.32) that
−
Z
Ω
IX
i=2
gi(ω
0)dt1(ω) > ε (3.34)
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Let d the least common denominator of the rational numbers
©
xi1, . . . , x
i
mi
ªI
i=2
. For
some big enough positive integer c, the functions
hi(ω) = dgi(ω) + c (3.35)
assume each Þnitely many positive integer values, and have the form
hi(ω) =
niX
k=1
χEik(ω) (3.36)
where Ei1, . . . , E
i
ni
is the list of expressions in which for ` = 1, . . . ,mi, and ω ∈ F i` , the
expression F i` appears hi(ω) times in the list.
It follows from (3.33) and (3.34) that for δ = dε > 0Z
Ω
hi(ω
0)dti(ω) > c+ δ, i = 2, . . . I (3.37)Z
Ω
IX
i=2
hi(ω
0)dt1(ω) < (I − 1) (c+ δ) (3.38)
for every ω ∈ Ω.
Let n = max2≤i≤I ni, L =
§
n
δ
¨
and uj = j
δ
n
for j = 0, . . . , L. Let
pωk,i =
½
min
0≤j≤L
uj : t1(ω)(E
i
k) < uj
¾
(3.38)
10
and
qωk,i =
½
max
0≤j≤L
uj : ti(ω)(E
i
k) ≥ uj
¾
, i = 2, . . . I. (3.39)
Then for every ω ∈ Ω, the expression
I\
i=2
ni\
k=1
³
¬Bp
ω
k,i
1 E
i
k ∩B
qωk,i
i E
i
k
´
(3.40)
holds at ω, and by (3.37) and (3.38)
niX
k=1
qωk,i > c (3.41)
IX
i=2
niX
k=1
pωk,i < (I − 1)c (3.42)
But the set
©
pωk,i, q
ω
k,i : i = 2, . . . , I, k = 1, . . . ni, ω ∈ Ω
ª
is Þnite (the number of its
elements does not exceed (L+ 1)2I), and therefore it can be written as©
prk,i, q
r
k,i : i = 2, . . . , I, k = 1, . . . ni, r = 1, . . . , s
ª
for some Þnite number s. It follows
that the expression
s[
r=1
I\
i=2
ni\
k=1
³
¬Bp
r
k,i
1 E
i
k ∩B
qrk,i
i E
i
k
´
(3.43)
holds in all the states of Ω, while
niX
k=1
qrk,i > c (3.44)
IX
i=2
niX
k=1
prk,i < (I − 1)c (3.45)
for r = 1, . . . , s. Since Ω is common belief in any of its states, the conclusion of the
proposition follows. ¥
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4 Appendix
A short proof of Proposition 1. For each of the players i = 1, 2, the map ω →
ti(ω) is continuous. Hence the image of this map, ti(Ω)  player is set of types  is
a compact subset of ∆(Ω), and therefore so is its closed convex hull  player is set of
priors P(ti(Ω)).7 Thus, when there is no common prior, the two sets of priors can be
strongly separated: There is a continuous linear functional F on ∆(Ω) and a number c
for which F (p1) < c < F (p2) for priors p1, p2 of players 1 and 2 (and in particular their
types t1(ω), t2(ω)), respectively.
By the Riesz representation theorem, ∆(Ω) is the space of continuous linear func-
tionals on the space C(Ω) of continuous functions on Ω, with the deÞnition µ(f) =R
Ω
f(ω)dµ(ω) for f ∈ C(Ω) and µ ∈ ∆(Ω). Furthermore, the real valued mapping
hµ, fi ≡ R
Ω
f(ω)dµ(ω) from ∆(Ω) × C(Ω) is bilinear and separates the points of ∆(Ω)
and C(Ω). Hence, when ∆(Ω) is endowed with the weak-∗ topology, C(Ω) is the space of
continuous linear functionals on ∆(Ω), with the deÞnition f(µ) =
R
Ω
f(ω)dµ(ω) (see e.g.
Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 208, thm. 5.83)8
Therefore, when there is no common prior, there is a continuous function g ∈ C(Ω)
such that
R
Ω
g(ω)dt1(ω) < c <
R
Ω
g(ω)dt2(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω. DeÞning f = g− c, we getR
Ω
f(ω)dt1(ω) < 0 <
R
Ω
f(ω)dt2(ω), so f is a zero-sum bet that both players like to take.
¥
This proof generalizes a proof of Samet (1998). Samets proof of the characterization
of common priors for more than two players can now be generalized using the same
technique to yield a short proof of proposition 3.
7More explicitly, the mapping P : ∆(Ω)→ ∆(Ω) deÞned byZ
Ω
f(ω)d(P(ν))(ω) =
Z
Ω
µZ
Ω
f(ω0)d(ti(ω)(ω0)
¶
dν(ω)
for real valued continuous functions f ∈ C(Ω) is continuous, because the integrand on the right-hand
side is a real-valued continuous function on ∆(Ω) (if {να} is a net in ∆(Ω) that converges to ν ∈ ∆(Ω),
then Z
Ω
µZ
Ω
f(ω0)d(ti(ω)(ω0)
¶
dνα(ω)→
Z
Ω
µZ
Ω
f(ω0)d(ti(ω)(ω0)
¶
dν(ω)
for every f ∈ C(Ω), since R
Ω
f(ω0)d(ti(ω)(ω0) is continuous on Ω for each such f , and henceZ
Ω
f(ω)d(P(να))(ω)→
Z
Ω
f(ω)d(P(ν))(ω)
for every f ∈ C(Ω), which, by deÞnition of the weak-∗ topology on ∆(Ω), implies that P(να)→ P(ν)).
Therefore P (∆(Ω))  the set of priors of player i  is compact as the continuous image of a compact set.
8Im grateful to Kim Border for pointing out to me this property.
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